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   Losing Face
David Hugh-Jones and David Reinstein
September 27, 2010
Abstract
When person A makes an offer to person B and B rejects it, then A may “lose face.” This loss of face is assumed
to occur only if B knows for sure of A’s offer. While under some circumstances loss of face can be rationalized by the
consequences for future reputation, it may also enter directly into the utility function. Loss of face concerns can lead
to fewer offers and inefﬁciency in markets that involve matching, discrete transactions, and offers/proposals in both
directions, such as the marriage market, certain types of labor markets, admissions to colleges and universities, and
joint ventures and collaborations. We offer a simple model of this, and show that under some circumstances welfare
can be improved by a mechanism that only reveals offers when both parties say “yes.”
Keywords: Matching, marriage markets, anonymity, reputation, adverse selection, Bayesian games, emotions. JEL
codes: D83, D03
1 Introduction
In a market that involves two-sided matching (as surveyed in Burdett and Coles, 1999) the fear of rejection can lead to
inefﬁciency. A proposer may not ask someone out on a date, ask for a study partner, apply for a job, make a business
proposition, or propose a paper co-authorship, because she does not want the other party to know of her interest and
then turn her down. We call the disutility from this potential outcome “loss of face” (LoF).12
Consider a matching game where each player can choose “accept” or “reject,” there is asymmetric information about
players’ types, and the outcome of the game (actions and payoffs) becomes common knowledge after all actions have
been taken. Under reasonable assumptions over the gains to a match and the loss of face cost, LoF will worsen the set
of Nash equilibria, ruling out the most efﬁcient outcomes and allowing less efﬁcient ones. Assuming coordination on
the most (or least) efﬁcient Nash equilibrium, LoF will make equilibrium play less efﬁcient. In this case there will be
a set of mutually beneﬁcial transactions that would occur without LoF, but do not occur with LoF because:
1. the proposer does not know for sure whether the other party will accept or reject and
2. a high enough probability of rejection can outweigh the expected gains to a successful transaction.
David Hugh-Jones is a research associate at Warwick (CAGE). David Reinstein is a lecturer in the Department of Economics at Essex Univer-
sity. Thanks to George Akerlof, Botond Koszegi, Kelly McCain, Alejandro Moreno , Kip Williams, and numerous seminar participants.
1In common parlance, a loss of face can have other causes and interpretations (e.g., a loss of face from acceding to an enemy’s demands, or from
being proved wrong); in our paper, the operational deﬁnition of LoF is limited and speciﬁc. In particular it must be distinguished from a model
where a proposer gets utility in her self image – as in Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Koszegi (2006) – and fears that learning of her own rejection
will lower her image of herself.
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knows her own quality, but not that of others. Then in many types of dynamic matching, sorting/screening, and
exclusion games, her willingness to match with, cooperate with, or not exclude another individual (henceforth, to
“accept” them) may be taken as a negative signal of her type, as in the equilibrium of Chade (2006). As a consequence,
the player she accepts (and perhaps others, if this is publicly observed) will downgrade his beliefs about her worth.3 If
we change the information structure so that others have private signals of an individual’s quality, an individual’s being
rejected will lead third parties to downgrade their beliefs about her worth. Her reputation, in turn, may impact her
utility either directly (as in Andreoni and Bernheim, 2008, Ellingsen and Johanesson, and Grossman (2008), where
reputation is a primal concern) or via her expected future material payoffs, as in Spence (1973) and Cho and Kreps
(1987).
However, as we discuss in section 2, there is evidence that a desire not to lose face is also a primal human concern,
perhaps a product of evolutionary factors, or perhaps an internalization of the reputation motive. In such a case the
disutility of openly accepting someone and being rejected by this person is not merely the cumulative effect of the
two types of signaling mentioned above; there is a special loss from the combined knowledge that you accepted
somebody, but they rejected you. The assumption of a primal LoF leads to a model that bears some resemblance to a
“psychological game,” (Geanakoplos et al. (1989)), in which payoffs depend on beliefs as well as actions. However,
in our model, payoffs depend not precisely on beliefs, but on information sets, speciﬁcally, the information sets at the
end nodes of the game.4 When (e.g.) a woman accepts a man and he rejects her, her material payoff is the same no
matter what beliefs or information set either party has. However, because of LoF, her psychic payoffs are lower when
it is common knowledge that she accepted him and he rejected her. In other words, what the other player knows for
sure – the other player’s information set – is a component of a player’s utility function (this is similar to Battigalli and
Dufwenberg (2007)). In particular, we assume that a probabilistic inference by the other player, that he may have been
accepted, does not cause loss of face. Unlike in models of fairness (Rabin (1993);Moreno, 2008) the payoffs do not
rely on a set of beliefs that are external to the game’s structure. Thus, as long as we know the (terminal) information
structure, LoF transforms material payoffs into psychic payoffs in a straightforward way.5 We will focus on the primal
LoF interpretation. We see this as particularly relevant in some cases, such as a one-shot game where no outside parties
observe the results.
If loss of face depends on the information sets in this way, then it can be avoided by changing the information sets
so that players only learn about each other’s behaviour if they both play Accept. (In technical terms, instead of ﬁnal
information sets being {{AA}, {AR}, {RA}, {RR}}, they become {{AA}, {AR,RA,RR}}.) For example, a speed
dating agency may ask men and women to mark the partners who they are interested in, and then inform only those
couples who both marked each other. Now, after playing Accept, you will still be able to infer if you have been
Rejected; but the other person will not know that you Accepted them, and, knowing this, you will not suffer a loss of
face. We call such setups Conditionally Anonymous Environments or CAEs. The setup where all actions are known
is the Full Revelation Environment, or FRE.
Our paper’s main insights are the following. There are circumstances in which LoF occurs even where it can not
be justiﬁed by a reputation motive; i.e., there is a “primal” LoF. It is well-known that with asymmetric information,
players may end up rejecting partners whom they would match with if actual types were known. However, if one or
both players face the possibility of LoF, this inefﬁciency may become worse: players may reject potential partners
even where their expected utility from a match is positive. This can lead to less efﬁcient equilibrium outcomes in
3To reinterpret Groucho Marx “if I am willing to be part of this club, how good can I be?”
4We assume the structure of information sets is common knowledge.
5Furthermore, LoF has no obvious interpretation in terms of fairness; since revelation of “who proposed to whom” or “who was kind to whom”
occurs after these decisions were made it should have no impact on beliefs about whether a player knew his play was “fair” in the sense of being
congruent with the other player’s kindness or unkindness.
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Changing the information structure of the game’s end nodes – in particular, only revealing mutual matches where both
players played Accept – can improve outcomes by eliminating the possibility of LoF.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we discuss our concept of in more detail, offer intuitive arguments, anec-
dotal evidence, and previous academic support for our model, and discuss situations where LoF is particularly relevant.
We also brieﬂy survey the related economic literature. In section 3.1we describe our baseline setup, resembling that
of earlier authors, and yielding only monotonic equilibria. In section 3.2 we introduce “end node histories” and LoF
to the model, and illustrate how this can cause a welfare loss, and how anonymity can improve this outcome. We
conclude in section 4 with a discussion of ways our model can be extended and tested empirically.
2 Background
There is abundant psychological evidence that “rejection hurts” (Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004) and that social
ostracism can cause a neurochemical effect that resembles physical pain Williams (2007). However, these studies do
not distinguish between cases where it is common knowledge that the rejected party has expressed an interest from
cases where this is private information. We claim that people fear proposing, and they fear it more when proposals are
known. We ask the reader: which of scenarios below would likely cause you more psychological pain?
1. A friend or colleague, in whom you have an unexpressed romantic interest, informs you while talking about his/her
tastes in men/women that s/he wouldn’t go out with you because you are not “his/her type.” You have no reason to
believe that s/he knows you are interested in him/her.
2. Without having the conversation in scenario 1, you ask this same person out on a date and s/he refuses because you
are not “his/her type.”
We speculate that the second scenario would be more painful: you now both know that you have asked him/her out
and s/he has refused. Although s/he may have tried to soften the blow by posing this as a matter of idiosyncratic
preference rather than quality, you have lost face, and you are established as his/her inferior in one sense. In the ﬁrst
case, although you can presume s/he is not interested in you, and this may hurt your self esteem, s/he doesn’t know
you like him/her, and you have not lost face.
The fear of LoF is closely related to what psychologists call “rejection sensitivity”. For example, London et al provide
evidence from a longitudinal study of middle school students that, for boys, “peer rejection at Time one predicted an
increase in anxious and angry expectations of rejection at Time 2.” They also ﬁnd that anxious and angry expectations
of rejection are positively correlated to later social anxiety, social withdrawal, and loneliness. in explaining the con-
nection to loneliness, they posit that the rejection sensitive may exhibit “‘ﬂight’ (social anxiety/withdrawal) or ’ﬁght
(aggression)”’ reactions. Each of these “behavioral overreactions ... can reduce possibilities for the type of social
relations that can combat loneliness.” It is easy to interpret either of these as a way to choose “reject” in our matching
game in order to avoid further loss of face. The psychological evidence motivates us to consider heterogeneity: sub-
jects with observable (e.g., sex, race) and unobservable (e.g., popularity) differences may be more or less concerned
with LoF.
Erving Goffman (2005) has written extensively about losing and preserving face:
The term face may be deﬁned as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the
line others assume he has taken during a particular contact ... A person tends to experience an immediate
emotional response to the face which a contact with others allows him.
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we discuss later), and institutions and norms are usually structured to allow this:
...the combined effect of the rule of self-respect and the rule of considerateness is that the person tends
to conduct himself during an encounter so as to maintain both his own face and the face of the other
participants ... Each culture has it’s own “repertoire of face-saving practices.
Individuals undertake various forms of “face-work” to preserve their face:
The avoidance process.– The surest way for a person to prevent threats to his face is to avoid contact in
which these threats are likely to occur. In all societies one can observe this in the avoidance relationship
and in the tendency for certain delicate transactions to be conducted by go-betweens ...
In the context of this paper, Goffman’s “avoidance” is essentially preemptive rejection: you cannot be matched with a
partner if you don’t show up.
According to a 2006 report, 37% of internet users who say they are single and seeking a romantic partner have gone on
online-dating websites;6 this industry earned an estimated $642 million in the US in 2007. Internet dating itself can be
seenasaninstitutiondesignedtominimizetheLoFthatcomeswithface-to-facetransactions, allowingpeopletoaccess
a network of potential partners who they are not likely to run into again at the ofﬁce or on the street. Furthermore,
several sites and applications on the social networking site “Facebook” have introduced the CAE environment, where
member A can express interest in member B and member B only ﬁnds out about this if B also expresses an interest
in A. However, there is a trade-off between preserving face and getting noticed: with thousands of members, each
member may only view a fraction of eligible dates, and if A expresses anonymous interest there is no guarantee that B
will even see A’s proﬁle.7
“Speed dating” events are another recent innovation in the singles scene. These events usually attract an equal number
customers of each gender; men rotate from one woman to another, spending a few minutes in conversation with each.
Here there is also an effort to minimize the possibility of LoF. In fact, speed dating agencies often promote themselves
on these grounds, e.g., Xpress dating advertises “Rejection free dating in a non-pressurized environment.”8 Typically,
participants are asked to select who they would like to go on “real dates” with only after the event is over. In most
cases the agency will only reveal these “proposals” where there is a mutual match, i.e., where both participants have
selected each other.9
LoF is not limited to the dating world. These concerns are also present on both sides of the job market. Within an
employment relationship, LoF can affect decisions over how much effort to put in, and whether to identify with the
ﬁrm, as well as whether to apply for promotions. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) consider a worker’s identity as an
“outsider” or “insider,” and claim that a ﬁrm can take steps to change this identity. In their model, “when an employee
has [insider] identity, she loses some utility insofar as she deviates from the ideal action of [the ﬁrm],” and for an
outsider this is reversed. This has a LoF interpretation. Suppose that my putting in visible effort is a clear sign that I
have identiﬁed with the ﬁrm, and not putting in effort is clear sign that I prefer to be an “outsider.” If I identify with
the ﬁrm and try hard I am playing “accept” in the game with the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm observes my effort and my success it
6Online Dating. Pew Internet & American Life Project. March 5, 2006. Available at www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Online_Dating.pdf
7Online dating has been portrayed as a modern analogue to the traditional “matchmaker,” who was able to separately interview prospective
mates and their families about their likes and preferences, helping arrange marriages while preserving anonymity.
8<http://www.xpressdating.co.uk/speed_intro.htm>
9“Speed dating” institutions have been extended outside the realm of romance and marriage, into forming study groups, “speed networking”,
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is a signaling issue: the fact that I was willing to work hard and identify with the ﬁrm implies that I think success at
this ﬁrm is a prize worth having, which may lead them (or others) to downgrade my status. But the ﬁrm’s rejection
also hurts a lot more if I have played “accept”, i.e., I have identiﬁed with the ﬁrm and tried hard: this is the primal
LoF. Because of this, employees who fear LoF may only try hard on tasks that they know they will succeed in. These
LoF-prone employees might also try hard on tasks where their effort will only be discovered if they are successful, e.g.,
projects they can work on in relative obscurity. The same authors’ (2000) model of social exclusion can be adapted to
a LoF interpretation: if being seen “acting white” involves sacriﬁcing Black identity, a Black person may choose not
to attempt “admission to the dominant culture” because she is uncertain about the “level of social exclusion” she will
face; e.g., whether she will be accepted by a school, employer, or white social group. On the other hand, if she can
make this attempt anonymously, she will do so without risking these identity losses.
The employer too may be vulnerable to LoF. Cawley (2003), in his guide for economists on the junior job market,
writes that he has “heard faculty darkly muttering about job candidates from years ago who led them on for a month
before turning them down.” This aggravation involves surely involves LoF in addition to the loss of time. This LoF is
recognized by professional recruiters as well: “recruiters lose face when candidates pull out of accepted engagements
at the last minute.” .10
For the rejection-sensitive, any economic transaction that involves an “ask” may risk a LoF. This may explain the
prevalence of posted prices, and aversion to bargaining in certain countries. Rejection sensitivity is particularly dis-
abling for sales personnel.11
A prominent case where the desire to preserve face, driven by instrumental concerns for reputation, may be leading
to inefﬁciency is the university admissions process at selective institutions. One particularly important measure of a
program’s quality and desirability is the "admit yield": the share of admissions offers that are taken up by students.
Indeed, this has been used by the US News and World Report in their college rankings. Some insiders claim that as
a result, admissions ofﬁcers speciﬁcally target admit yield, and “prefer a well-qualiﬁed applicant who they consider
likely to attend over an exceptionally qualiﬁed candidate who they believe would probably choose not to enroll.”12
In other words, a university may reject its strongest applicants in order to avoid being rejected by them. As a result,
an unlucky student may “fall between the cracks,” rejected by higher ranking schools for not being good enough, and
rejected by others for being “too good,” even though the match would be mutually beneﬁcial. Efﬁciency might be
improved by an admissions process with two-way ranking that only reveals a single “mutual match” between a student
and a college.13
Ourmodelmayalsobeimportantinanarchetypalsituationwhere“preservingface”isvaluedtheresolutionofpersonal
and political disagreements; essentially peacemaking. Neither side may want to make a peaceful overture unilaterally
– this can be seen as evidence of admission of guilt or weakness, and may be psychologically painful in itself. Again,
the double-blind mechanism can resolve this dilemma. Often, peace talks are made in secret, and only announced if a
successful agreement has been reached.
While previous economists have studied related concepts, to our knowledge no authors have considered the conse-
quences of common-knowledge rejection, as distinguished from rejection where only one side knows she was rejected.
10Leslie Merrow, Stafﬁng Consultancy Principal, “How to Avoid the Counter-Offer Trap,” Friday, August 17, 2007.
<http://directsearchalliance.blogspot.com/2007/08/how-to-avoid-counter-offer-trap.html>
11“Call reluctance, which strikes both individuals and teams, develops in many forms. Representatives may be ’gun shy’ from an onslaught of
rejection or actively avoid certain calling situations such as calling high-level decision makers or asking for the order. Call reluctance is the product
of fear; fear of failure, fear of losing face, fear of rejection or fear of making a mistake. If the fear perpetuates, productivity suffers.” – “Business
Services Industry Contests combat call reluctance,” Telemarketing & Call Center Solutions , Oct 1996 by Brian J. Geery.
12Lynn Radlauer Lubell, Founder of Admission By Design, an educational consultancy. <http://www.inlikeme.com/apply/early-action-and-early-
decision-what-you-need-know.html> accessed on August 4, 2010.
13While such “ranking schemes” are potentially vulnerable to manipulationGale, D. and Shapley, L. S. (1962), these may be an improvement on
the current system.
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generated from marriage through a household production function that takes into account both husband and wife’s
wage rates and productivity in the market and non-market sectors. His model allows the division of output between
spouses to be divided ex-ante according to each party’s outside option in an efﬁcient “marriage market.” In this con-
text the interaction between a potential husband and wife would involve not just each party’s decision to “accept”
or “reject” but a negotiation over who will get what out of the marriage (perhaps resembling a marriage contract).
Anderson and Smith brought reputation into this context, noting “matches yield not only output but also information
about types,” Anderson and Smith (Anderson and Smith). Chade (2006) explored a search and matching environment
where participants observe “a noisy signal of the true type of any potential mate.” He noted “as in the winner’s curse
in auction theory – information about a partner’s type [is] contained in his or her acceptance decision.” However, in
Chade’s model there is only a single interaction between the same man and woman, and outside parties do not observe
the results; thus there is no scope for either party’s actions to affect their future reputations (nor any direct cost of
being rejected). Our work shares some features of models of directed search but there are some important differences.
In the previous employment models, the cost of submitting a job application is unrelated to the probability of success,
as well as unrelated to whether the employer knows a candidate has applied. In our model, the job seeker knows that
if there is a high probability they will get the job (even if they do not accept the offer), there is a low probability they
will lose face, and thus this cost is low in expectation.
3 Model
3.1 Basic setup
Consider a simple one-period matching game with two players F and M.14 Action spaces for both players are fA;Rg
where A denotes “accept” and R “reject”. We assume asymmetric information: each player knows only his or her
own type.15 Types are xJ 2 R for J 2 fF;Mg, both drawn independently from distributions with cdf’s FF and FM.
We assume both have bounded support; without loss of generality let this be [t;t]. Players choose complete strategy
functions sJ(xJ), xJ 2 [t;t], where sJ(xJ) speciﬁes a probability of choosing Accept for a particular type. Material











1 < 0 ,
and
14The notation loosely follows Chade (2006). For notational simplicity, we state the same distributions over type, matching functions, and LoF
functions for M and F. However,. we could allow these to differ for each player and all of our results would be preserved.
15In a similar game with symmetric information, LoF is less interesting. It does not affect the Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium. However, if both
players get positive utility from a match, “reject” is weakly dominated for both players in the standard game, but if both players have LoF concerns
neither actions is dominated.
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The ﬁrst assumption embodies agreed-upon preferences over a partner’s type (as in Chade (2006) and many other
papers) – partner’s are “better” or “worse” along a single dimension. The assumption that gJ
1 < 0 can be justiﬁed if we
interpret the payoff as the gain to a match relative to remaining single. For example, let each player’s gain from not
matching be equal to his or her type; this contrasts with Becker (1973), but agrees with Chade’s (2006) results in sign.
If types represent productivity, it is plausible that those who add a lot of value in a match will be also be productive
alone, and those who are unproductive alone have more to gain from matching with someone of a given type.16 Let
J’s gain from (A;A) equal ˆ gJ(xK) for K 6= J. Then for each type we can rewrite his utility, by a shift of the origin, as
gJ(xJ;xK) = ˆ gJ(xK) xJ from (A;A) and 0 = xJ  xJ for not trading. The ﬁnal assumption implies that, on each side
of the market, there are some types, occurring with positive probability, that gain even from a match with a partner of
the lowest type.
There is always an equilibrium where both players always reject . since if so, both get 0 whatever they play). We focus
only on “nontrivial” equilibria, where players always accept with some minimum probability e > 0 . We note that the
no-matching equilibrium involves weakly dominated strategy proﬁles (and is thus not trembling-hand perfect) and is
not stable – if a single type chooses A then, given the third assumption above, a positive-probability set of types will
also gain by choosing A.
Lemma. Anynontrivialequilibriumismonotonic, withalltypesbelowsomecutpoint ˆ xJ playingacceptforJ 2fF;Mg.
Proof. If nobody accepts, deﬁne ˆ xJ = t. Otherwise, player J accepts if Pr(A)E(gJ(xJ;xK)jxK 2 Ak)  0 where Pr(A)
is the probability the other type plays accept, and the expectation is taken over the set of types that accept, For a
nontrivial equilibrium, Pr(A)  e > 0 by assumption, and gJ is strictly decreasing in xJ, so if type x accepts so must
all types x0 < x.
Thus we have shown the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which the strategies are:
sJ(xJ) =
(
A if xJ  ˆ xJ
R if x > ˆ xJ
for J 2 fF;Mg
We cannot yet rule out multiple equilibria, since J’s best response cutpoint is increasing in K’s cutpoint.
In this game with material payoffs, sequence is irrelevant.17 Since both players’ actions impact payoffs only in the
case that the other player plays accept, it does not change their best response if they learn whether or not the other
player did in fact accept; the same “acceptance curse”(Chade, 2006) occurs in either case. For concreteness, we offer
a parametric example in appendix A.1.
3.2 With loss of face and incomplete information
Since LoF results from the common knowledge of one party accepting and the other rejecting, to model LoF we need
to make payoffs depend not only on actions, but also on information sets. The set of end nodes of the game, deﬁned
16This might also be justiﬁed through interpreting the payoff to no match as the continuation value in an indeﬁnitely repeated version of the
matching game. In Chade (2006) this value increases in type as higher-type players tend to have higher signals and other players accept them more
often. However, this does not hold in our model as we have no such signals.
17By “sequence is irrelevant” we mean that in a sequential game in which (say) player M observes F’s move before making his own, M’s action
after observing F’s acceptance will be a if and only if xM  ˆ xM as deﬁned above; his action after observing a rejection can be anything. And given
this, F will play A if and only if her type is less than ˆ xF.
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by their histories, is h = fh1;h2;h3;h4g = fAA;AR;RA;RRg.18 Let ¯ IF be the collection of player F’s information
sets over these endnodes, and ¯ IM be player M’s information partition (we will call each element of these “terminal
information sets”).19 For example, if there is full revelation, then
¯ IF = ¯ IM = ffAAg;fARg;fRAg;fRRgg: (2)
This game is illustrated in the game tree in ﬁgure 1 (material payoffs are displayed in each of the ﬁgures below). Since
neither player “has the move” at the terminal node, we give each history two boxes to depict each player’s information
set; hj(M) and hj(F) are the same (for j 2 f1;2;3;4g). Note that even though M does not observe F’s choice before
his move, he does observe it at the terminal node.
18We leave nature’s move out of these histories; it does not affect our discussion. For completeness we can assume that player’s never learn the
other player’s type. Thus, in our model LoF will only depend on the conditional expectation of the other player’s type, not the type itself.
19While these interactions could also be depicted in a more standard notation, this terminology is intuitive and convenient for our purposes.
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¯ IF = ffAAg;fARg;fRA;RRgg and ¯ IM = ffAAg;fAR;RRg;fRAgg: (3)
Note in ﬁgure 1, depicting this simultaneous FRE, that the fAAg information set is a singleton for both players, while
the histories where a player played “reject” are connected by an information set (for that player).
We model loss of face as depending directly on the information set, and on inferences each player can make about the
other’s information set.
In particular, player J loses face when
1. J played accept.
2. J knows that player K played reject.
3. J knows that K knows that J played accept.
The second point is always satisﬁed when AR or RA is played, since players who played accept can infer directly
from their payoffs whether they were accepted or rejected.20 Suppose F arrives at her information set fARg under full
revelation. Then she knows that M is at his information setfARg also. On the other hand if only mutual acceptances
are revealed then F only knows that M is at fAR;RRg. In the ﬁrst case, M has learned something about F’s type; in the
second case not. This is a potential signaling reason for LoF, which would require us to analyze equilibrium strategies
to ﬁgure out what M has learned. For the present paper, we just assume that if conditions 1-3 are fulﬁlled, player J
suffers a loss LJ(xJ;XK(xk)), a composition of functions which may depend on her type xJ and on her belief over the
probability distribution over the other’s type, the cumulative probability density function XK = XK(xk) =FJ(xkjxk <
ˆ xk).
Whenonlymutualacceptancesarerevealed(asinﬁgure2), neitherplayercansufferalossofface, sinceafteraccepting
and being rejected, player J knows that the other player does not know whether J played accept or reject. Thus, the
payoffs and the equilibrium are the same as those with material payoffs. However, with full revelation, the game is
altered. Now, if either AR or RA is played, the accepting player J loses LJ(xJ;XK) where XK is the posterior distribution






This is depicted in ﬁgure 3.
20This assumes that g is nowhere constant at 0 and that f has no mass points.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 068Figure 2: Simultaneous game, conditionally anonymous environment, extensive form.
Figure 3: Overall payoffs, simultaneous game, full revelation environment, extensive form.
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Asn 5. LJ(xJ;XK) > LJ(xJ;X0
K) if X0
K ﬁrst order stochastically dominates XK.
That is, it hurts more to be (and know that you have been) rejected by someone you think is a lower type, and it hurts
more to be (and know that you have been) rejected if you are a higher type (higher types may have more “pride”,).21
In particular, this includes the case LJ(xJ;XK) = E(lJ(xJ;xK)) where the expectation is taken over the other player’s
types, where lJ(xJ;xK) is a “realized loss of face,” and where ¶lJ=¶xK < 0: this may hold when LoF is caused by
reputation concerns, for instance.
We also make the natural assumption that
Asn 6. LJ(xJ;XK) > 0 for all xJ;XK
so that (commonly-known) rejection always hurts to some extent. With these assumptions we can guarantee that an
equilibrium exists, is monotonic, and that LoF may cause harm in the sense described below.
Proof of existence of equilibrium with LoF: In the Appendix, we use Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem to prove the
existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 1. With full revelation and LoF, any equilibrium is monotonic. Furthermore, the lowest and highest
equilibrium cutpoints are weakly lower than in the game with material payoffs, and strictly lower if they are within the
interior(t;¯ t). When LoF implies lower equilibrium cutpoints this implies lower social welfare, even net of LoF.
We modestly refer to this proportion as “the Fundamental Theorem of Face.” The proof is in the appendix. The
intuition is straightforward: loss of face makes playing accept (ex ante) less attractive for each party. Since lower
types always play accept, the result of this is a lower cutpoint. This effect is ampliﬁed by the interaction between
cutpoints: when M’s cutpoint becomes lower, M’s who play Accept become less attractive and so F follows suit by
lowering her cutpoint. An example is shown in Figure 4 on page 12.
As this ﬁgure shows, when Loss of Face becomes an issue, the highest and lowest equilibria move downwards, though
intermediate equilibria need not. Thus if we assume coordination on the Pareto-preferred equilibrium (or assume a
single-crossing condition), as long as all parties do not already match under the Full Revelation Environment, moving
to the Conditionally Anonymous Environment will not only eliminate welfare losses from LoF, but also increase the
expected number of matches. These effects must increase welfare: (all types) lower types gain by the “entry” of the
new higher types (a better pool playing “accept”), and, as the these better types now decide that playing “accept” is
better for them, their welfare must also be improved.
3.3 Parametric example
We offer a simple parametric example to illustrate how Loss of Face can cause a loss of welfare. Let:
21This second assumption is not necessary for any of our later results; in fact, if LoF decreases in the expected type of the other player, this will
diminish the effect mentioned in proposition 1. As LoF causes the equilibrium cutpoint to decline, the expected type of a player who rejects also
declines, lessening the expected LoF from accepting and being rejected. We included this to show the robustness of our model to what we see as
an intuitive assumption – being rejected by someone you think is of little worth (“even he rejects me”) might be more painful. This might also
be loosely justiﬁed by a reputation story – proposing to the highest type should reveal little about my own type, as nearly everyone would want to
match with her.
11
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 068Figure 4: Equilibria with and without loss of face. The lines are best response functions: dashed lines include loss
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4 +I[E(xKjsK = R) > xJ](xJ  E(xKjsK = R))
and xJ and xK U(0;1),
where J;K 2 M;FandJ 6=K, I represents the indicator function and sK = sK(xK);k’s realized strategy.
In the case without Loss of Face, there are two equilibria; there is an unstable trivial equilibrium, where no one chooses
“accept.” The probability of accepting is ˆ xJ for J 2 fM;Fg, the cutoff point. The probability of not accepting is 1-ˆ xJ.
Simple algebra yields the best responding cutpoints ˆ xJ = 1
4 + 1
2 ˆ xK, yielding the nontrivial equilibrium strategy proﬁle,
ˆ xM = ˆ xF = 1








In the LoF case, the utility of rejecting for any individual is zero, while the utility of accepting is given by:
U =(probabilityof Accepting)(ExpectedGainof Accepting) (ProbabilityOf Rejecting)(ExpectedLossOf Faceif LoseFace)
The expected gain from the match for a player of type xJ is again 1
4 + ˆ xK
2  xJ. The expected Loss of Face (if it occurs)
is 1
4 +xJ  E(xKjxK > ˆ xK)) where xJ > E(xKjxK > ˆ xK) and 1
4 otherwise. . Thus the expected utility from a type xJ
player playing accept is given by : UJ(xj;jˆ xK) = ˆ xK(1
4 + ˆ xK
2  xJ) (1  ˆ xK)(1
4) if xJ < 1+ˆ xK
2 and ˆ xK(1
4 + ˆ xK
2  xJ) 
(1  ˆ xK)(1
4 +xJ   ˆ xK
2 ) otherwise. Solving for the xj that yields zero utility as a function of ˆ xK yields the equilibrium
cutoff point condition ˆ xJ = ˆ xK   1
4 in the latter case, and ˆ xJ = 1
4
1
ˆ xK (2ˆ xK +2(ˆ xK)2 1) in the former case. By symmetry,
we can substitute J and K in each reaction function. Clearly, there can be no equilibrium where both players’ cutpoints
are above their expectation for the other “rejecting” player’s type, and we can show that also no equilibrium where
one player’s cutpoint is above and the others’ below. 22 If both cutpoints are below this expectation, we substitute in
22Substituting the “lower” reaction function into the higher one yields ˆ xJ = 1
4
1
ˆ xK (2ˆ xK +2(ˆ xK)2  1)  1
4;which has no real solution.
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2  0:145. This implies that each player only plays “accept”










4)0:005 for each player.23 Thus, the Pareto-preferred LoF equilibrium implies fewer matches and,
even leaving out the LoF component, lower expected “material” utility than the Pareto-optimal equilibrium before loss
of face.
4 Conclusion and suggestions for future work
Our work has potential normative implications. Some mechanisms and policies may be more efﬁcient then others
in the presence of LoF effects, and ﬁrms and policymakers should take this into account. Although setting up a
conditionally anonymous environments may take some administrative effort, and may require a third-party monitor,
we suspect that there are many cases in which it will lead to more and better matches and improve outcomes.
This modeling of this paper can be expanded in several ways, relaxing many of our assumptions and generalizing
our results. Future research should more directly connect the LoF to the impact of revealing offers on a how others
estimate a player’s type, in an environment where players have private and public signals of there own and others’
types; however we should bear in mind that in many contexts, LoF may have an impact over and above the effect
on reputation. In equilibrium, the effects of revealing offers on reputation and on match efﬁciency may be complex.
If a player is known to be vulnerable to LoF, his making an offer might actually be interpreted as a signal of his
conﬁdence that he will be accepted, thus a positive signal about his own type. Whenever a player rejects another, there
is some possibility that she did so merely to avoid losing face; noting this possibility should presumably “soften the
blow” to a player’s reputation when she is rejected. Relaxing the assumptions further, preferences over types may
be heterogeneous, or may involve a horizontal component, this may also change the equilibrium reputation effects of
revealing offers. It also may be interesting to consider the effects of a player who is either altruistic, suffering when
the other player loses face, or spiteful, relishing in making others lose face. Considering a sequential game where
only the ﬁrst mover is vulnerable to a LoF and the second movers is a known altruist. Here the ﬁrst-mover might
manipulate this altruism, playing “accept” and in effect guilting the second-mover into matching with her; this could
lead to inefﬁcient matching.
Empirically, our anecdotal and referential evidence for LoF should be supplemented by evidence from laboratory and
ﬁeld experiments.As well as strengthening the evidence for the existence of this motivation, these should examine the
causes and correlates of LoF, and its efﬁciency consequences in various environments. Do people act strategically to
minimize their own risk of LoF? Will they be willing to pay to preserve the anonymity of their offers? Who is most
affected by loss of face and when? How can these issues be addressed to improve matching efﬁciency in real-world
environments? We hope that future research will offers empirical answers to these questions.
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Proof of existence of equilibrium with LoF:
Deﬁnition of Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem: Suppose that A  RN is a nonempty, compact, convex set, and that
f : A ! A is a continuous function from A into itself. Then f() has a ﬁxed point (x = f(x)).
First we note that an individual’s strategy is an action for each type t, to accept or reject. If we deﬁne as f() the function
that gives the minimum ti for which an individual i plays accept, given that the other individual’s strategy is to accept
when his type is higher than a value tj. Given that an individual will always play accept when her type is higher than
the minimum value ti, the function f() represents each player’s best response to the other player’s strategy. f() is the
value of t that solves the following equation:
Pr(a)E(g(x;y)ja) lPr(r)L(x;E(yjr)) = 0
f() goes from A to A, where A is the space of types andA goes fromt to ¯ t and therefore A is a non-empty, compact, and
convex set. The function f() is continuous, if g(x;y);L(x;y) and the distribution of types are all continuous functions.
By Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem there is a value of t for which t = f(t). This is an equilibrium.
A.1 Parametric example of basic setup












b , and a bit of algebra shows that




and always negative for x >
1+b
1+2b , so some types always want to accept, and some never do (each occuring with
positive probability).




x . Then ˆ x solves
E(g(ˆ x;y)jy < ˆ y) = 1





















whereW = (2b +1)[log(1+b   ˆ y) log(1+b)] < 0:
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= ˆ y =
ˆ x+W
W
! ˆ x =
ˆ x+W
W







! ˆ x =
(2b +1)[log(1+b   ˆ x) log(1+b)]
(2b +1)[log(1+b   ˆ x) log(1+b)] 1
:




[log(1 ˆ x)] 1, which is only solved by ˆ x = 0; this resembles the extreme “lemons” case of Akerlof (1970). Similarly,
with b = 0:1, ˆ x = 0:1453:: Plotting ˆ x (and hence ˆ y) for b = 0::1:
Figure 5: Plotting ...
Note that with this functional form “higher than average” types will never want to accept for any value of b.
Proposition 2. With full revelation and LoF, any equilibrium is monotonic. Furthermore, the lowest and highest
equilibrium cutpoints are weakly lower than in the game with material payoffs, and strictly lower if they are within the
interior(t;¯ t).
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Pr(A)E(gJ(xJ;xK)jxK 2 AK) (1 Pr(A))lLJ(xJ;XK)  0 (6)
where Pr(A) is the probability that player K plays Accept. Exactly as before, the left hand side is strictly decreasing
in xJ so that the best response functions are monotonic. We can treat the players’ strategies as a choice of cutpoints,




Pr(A)E(gJ(xJ;xK)jxK > ˆ xK) (1 Pr(A))lLJ(xJ;XK)
	
dF(xK).
Proof. We next show that the lowest and highest equilibrium cutpoints are weakly lower when l increases (including
when it increases from 0 to 1).
First, let ˆ x
J(ˆ xk) be J’s best response cutpoint when K’s cutpoint is ˆ xk. An equilibrium is deﬁned by a pair of points
ˆ xJ = ˆ x
J(ˆ xk); ˆ xk = ˆ x
K(xJ). We show that ˆ x
J(ˆ xk) is weakly increasing everywhere, and strictly increasing on the interior
(t;¯ t).
Proof
An increase in ˆ xk has three effects:
First, it increases E(gJ(xJ;xK)) since gJ
2 > 0
Second it decreases LJ, since XK, the conditional cdf given cutpoint ˆ xk is




0; x < xK
F(x) F(xK)
1 F(xK) x 2 (xK;¯ t]
and thus ˆ x0
k > ˆ xk implies Fˆ x0
k ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Fˆ xk.
Third, it increases Pr(A) and decreases the probability of rejection.
The ﬁrst two effects always increase the left hand side of (6) (strictly for the ﬁrst effect), and the last effect weakly
increases it at the equilibrium point ˆ x
J, since there E(gJ(xJ;xK)) must be non-negative. We have just shown that
the game is supermodular in (xJ;xK). Also, an increase in l must decrease ˆ x
J(ˆ xK), as is immediate from (6); thus
the game has increasing differences in (xJ; l). These sufﬁce to show that the highest and lowest cutpoints are
weakly decreasing in l (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). To show they are strictly decreasing on the interior observe
that an increase in l must strictly decrease the ˆ xJ that solves (6) with equality, and that if ˆ xJ decreases an interior best
response ˆ x
K(ˆ xJ) must also strictly decrease.
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